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Manufacturers, suppliers and others provide what you see here, and we have not verified it. See our disclaimer. This book explores the complex ways in which people lived and worked within the confines of Benito Mussolini's regime in Italy, variously embracing, appropriating, accommodating and avoiding the regime's incursions into everyday life. The contributions highlight the experiences of ordinary Italians -- midwives and schoolchildren, colonists and soldiers -- over the course of the Fascist era, in settings ranging from the street to the farm, and from the kitchen to the police station.
At the same time, this volume also provides a framework for understanding the Italian experience in relation to other totalitarian dictatorships in twentieth-century Europe and beyond. Customer Reviews. Write a review. See any care plans, options and policies that may be associated with this product. Email address. Please enter a valid email address. Walmart Services. Get to Know Us. The majority belong to the local municipal authority, many of which were first constructed under the Fascist regime and designed as multi-sport venues for the specific use and benefit of the local community rather than uniquely for football clubs.
In the UK, in addition to the huge amounts of wealth generated by television rights for coverage of the Premier League, clubs receive financial support from central government initiatives and funded agencies to modernise their stadiums, most notably after the Hillsborough disaster. UK stadiums have thus become part of a wider leisure experience that clubs can exploit seven days per week whereas in Italy, where various governments have employed little more than knee-jerk crisis management, the necessary changes required for true modernisation remain blocked by the neo-patrimonial relationship between football, politics and business.
Thus, the government regulations that have been introduced have tended to focus on those who attend matches rather than the game and its infrastructure, which has augmented the sense of persecution and anger among fans. As Doige has argued:. The communal nature of Italian stadiums is clearly reductive.
At the current time, no one is considering the experience of fans […] By permitting clubs to own their own ground, they will be inclined to consider the experiences of their own fans. If the clubs can invest in the facilities then they can begin to capitalize on these investments and begin to compete with other leagues. They can also attract a wider range of fans, rather than the predominantly masculine fans that frequent the stadium nowadays. The lack of investment has thus contributed to unsafe stadiums, falling attendances, reduced revenues, and a continuing crisis within Italian football that has stimulated and permitted a growth in violence and extremism for which nobody appears to accept responsibility.
The fascist movement that has brought Mussolini back to the mainstream – podcast
In terms of modernising calcio , only Juventus has shown any initiative with its construction of the Juventus Stadium 37 that opened in , although it must also be noted that the club has almost unrivalled access to private capital. Elsewhere, stadiums built in the s and s have fallen into disrepair with little renovation since the works undertaken for the World Cup. Thus, the modernisation of Italian football is dependent upon both the money and will to implement and enforce necessary changes.
With both of these severely lacking, they can be seen to have contributed to many of the extremist incidents discussed, which includes the representation and growth of Fascism and racism within Italian stadiums, a phenomenon that continues to go unchecked. History is rarely linear, and the pathway from Fascist football in s Italy to neo-Fascism in the stadiums of today is far from direct.
Fascism was not, however, rooted deeply enough in Italian society for its postwar survival and positive memory to be seen as inevitable. The ideological and class conflict in the midst of the fight for liberation from created a division in Italy along political lines that has never been fully reconciled.
The consequence has been a divided memory of the past that has been further fuelled by ignorance, periods of extreme political violence, and an inefficient state apparatus that rewards connections over talent and, in the early postwar years, provided a welcome refuge for those with nostalgic memories of the past. The neo-Fascist presence has never been strong enough to seriously threaten a return, but it did slow processes, change, and reforms that might have seen the development of a more efficient country and one in which such nostalgia was positively discouraged.
The absent state has frequently shown itself as both incapable of creating law and enforcing what legislation already exists. Evident cases in point, the stadiums became vacuums of authority that accommodated the politics of the Italian piazzas. Public and more or less de facto autonomous spaces, while they were initially exploited by both left- and right-wing extremists, they have increasingly become the domain of neo-Fascist groups wishing to express what would normally be considered unacceptable speech.
Ranging from the production of a more palatable version of history to the direct rehabilitation of Fascism, the link from Mussolini to the Anne Frank stickers at the Stadio Olimpico is clear. Bonini, Francesco , Le istituzioni sportive Italiane.
Storia e politica. Torino: Giappichelli. Accessed on Bromberger, Christian , La partita di calcio. Etnologia di una passione. Rome: Riuniti. Accessed on Cantagalli, Roberto , Storia del fascismo fiorentino Firenze: Vallecchi. London: Bloomsbury.
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Cassese, Sabino , Governare gli Italiani. Storia dello Stato. Bologna: il Mulino. Chiappaventi, Guy , Pistole e palloni. Milano: Limina. London: Bloomsbury Academic. London: Longman. Falasca-Zamponi, Simonetta , Fascist Spectacles. Berkeley: University of California Press. Politica, istituzioni e diplomazia sportiva. Milano: Franco Angeli. Galluzzo, Andrea , Il fiorentino. Vita e opere del marchese Luigi Ridolfi. Firenze: Edifir, Society and Politics Basingstoke: Penguin. Cambridge: University Press. Lepre, Antonio , Storia della Prima Repubblica.
Bologna: Mulino. Martin, Simon , Football and Fascism.
Football, fascism and fandom in modern Italy | Eurozine
London: Berg. Bollati: Boringhieri. There remained a prevalence of military forms of training and tactics and military personnel among the officers.
The Schutzpolizei had to face high levels of crime during the early years of the Weimar Republic due to food shortages and revolutionary unrest. Though crime levels dropped from the mid-twenties onwards, they had to deal with an increase in bureaucratic tasks, whilst during the early thirties political radicalism and growing unemployment burdened their workload. The Social Democrat government intended to limit the use of the army in policing given its questionable loyalty to the Republic and desired to create a police that worked with and was a part of the civilian public.
Yet, this did not preclude the creation of a heavily armed police force that had to be able to deal with a Communist revolutionary threat. Though the Schutzpolizei managed to quell a major Communist uprising in Saxony in March without substantial army support, the corps subsequently underwent far greater instruction in the use of arms than in ordinary policing Moreover, many police leaders, some of whom Social Democrats, shared authoritarian concepts concerning the role of the police as defender by any means and regardless of legal considerations of the German state and its people.
Such concepts had quite a lot in common with Nazi police theory The perceived failure of the Weimar Republic to empower the police to deal adequately with ordinary crime was also crucial for police support of Nazism.
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Patrick Wagner shows, for example, how the Berlin Kriminalpolizei felt frustrated in its attempts to repress a powerful criminal underworld during the late twenties, because of excessive concerns on the part of the judiciary for the rights of defendants, with the result that it was difficult to have criminals convicted. This helped to intensify the belief among detectives that the police should have greater power and autonomy from an excessively Liberal judicial system in order to preventively detain habitual criminals, some of whom for life.
Many were undoubtedly moved by Nazi promises that if they came to power the police would no longer be humiliated in their fight against crime In comparison with Weimar Germany, the influence that matters concerning ordinary crime may have had on police support for right-wing authoritarian take-overs in Italy and Spain does not appear to have been the object of any detailed research.
While during the twenties police salaries were generally not better than those in the mainly lower-middle class professions that policemen had previously occupied and, indeed, got comparatively worse during the late twenties , policemen were grateful for a safe job. In theory, when year contracts in the Schutzpolizei expired, policemen would find employment in other areas of state administration.
In practice, this did not happen This created tensions with the Social Democrat government and increased police support for the Nazis. Ex-policemen were extremely bitter about their treatment by the Republic, forming protest organizations, which openly insulted the German state and public authorities over this In his comparison of Italian squadrismo and the German SA, Reichardt argues, however, that police collaboration with the Nazis was not as open as in Italy.
This depended on the fact that the German state exercised greater territorial control in dealing with law and order difficulties. It managed to maintain greater loyalty on the part of policemen as a result of career conditions that were still comparatively better than in Italy Ironically, this may have increased rather than reduced the risks of police involvement in Nazi activities. The Prussian Minister of the Interior, Carl Severing justified his failure to call out the Schutzpolizei on the grounds that under martial law the police were no longer subject to the authority of the Prussian government.
Liang argues that as long as their superiors did not resist the army, the rank-and-file of the Schutzpolizei were hardly likely to react either. Moreover, most had not evolved a sense of political self-reliance under the Weimar Republic, to which they were mainly unsympathetic anyway. A few did contemplate armed resistance in support of a minority of Republican officers Liang notes that policemen turned a blind eye to Nazi activities and carried out selective arrests to the advantage of Nazis when they were involved in fights with Communists.
Police support for the Nazis during this stage was more official than in Italy. Policemen were allowed to join the Nazi party and openly went to Nazi rallies. Pro-Nazi police leaders intimidated the rank-and-file by carrying out investigations of policemen for alleged acts of brutality against Nazis Bessel argues that while many police officers were Nazi supporters, just as many were not.
Because of their sense of professional identity and concern about their careers, those who were not fanatical Nazis most probably accepted the transition to an authoritarian system founded on the restoration of order and respect for the police Levels of political violence during the phase leading up to the military rebellion were far higher than in pre-Nazi Weimar Germany and pre-Fascist Liberal Italy.
Moreover, the violence mainly came from left-wing groups and parties, including the Socialists, with the Falangists playing a more defensive role and acting in isolated groups in comparison to well-organized squads of Blackshirts or Stormtroopers The Republic was initially tough on law and order, but this combined in a contradictory manner with a restructuring and attempted democratization in the wake of the defeat of the de Rivera dictatorship of the armed forces that had traditionally been responsible for law and order maintenance in Spain.
According to Stanley Payne, military reforms did not weaken the scope of military jurisdiction in Spain. The Law for the Defence of the Republic of allowed a continuation of strong government measures and the suspension of civil guarantees where required. The new Public Order Law of , replacing the law, provided for states of legal exception of varying intensity but including the imposition of martial law, while military courts continued to judge cases of abuse of power by the Civil Guard and verbal insults against the Civil Guard The Republican government also created a new national police force, the Assault Guards Guardia de Asalto for service in the cities alongside the urban Security police- Seguridad that was originally intended as a professionally trained civilian alternative to the army or Civil Guard for dealing with urban unrest The Republic frequently imposed martial law and other restrictions on constitutional guarantees in the face of destabilization attempts by left-wing revolutionary groups.
The Assault Guards gradually took on a military character, and only differed from the Civil Guard in name and uniform, while a military figure still occupied the general inspectorate of the Civil Guard The army, Civil Guard and the Assault Guards behaved brutally in the face of peasant rebellions and general strikes, and with relative impunity.
While they were in government , the Socialists supported this tough public order stance especially because the main targets of the repression Communists and Anarcho-Syndicalists were political rivals At the local level, individual guards felt humiliated at having to take orders from Republican and Socialist councillors It is likely, in addition, that increased civilian control of the Civil Guard, though of questionable significance in terms of law and order maintenance, and the dismissal of the commander in chief, Sanjurjo, in , because of his suspected disloyalty to the government 36 , outraged many within the corps.
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